


# THE GLOBAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC SERVANTS

## Approach & Conceptual Framework



JAN MEYER-SAHLING<sup>Ⓞ</sup>DINSHA MISTREE<sup>Ⓞ</sup>KIM MIKKELSEN<sup>Ⓞ</sup>KATHERINE BERSCH<sup>Ⓞ</sup>  
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA<sup>Ⓞ</sup>KERENSSA KAY<sup>Ⓞ</sup>CHRISTIAN SCHUSTER<sup>Ⓞ</sup>ZAHID HASNAIN<sup>Ⓞ</sup>  
DANIEL ROGGER<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Author order randomized. Document last updated: May 2021



# Global Survey of Public Servants

Stanford University | University College London | University of Nottingham | World Bank



## Stanford University Affiliates

Katherine Bersch

*Assistant Professor of Political Science at Davidson College*

Francis Fukuyama

*Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University*

Dinsha Mistree

*Research Fellow and Lecturer in the Rule of Law Program at Stanford University Law School*



## University College London Affiliates

Christian Schuster

*Professor in Public Management at University College London*



## University of Nottingham Affiliates

Jan Meyer-Sahling

*Professor of Political Science at the University of Nottingham*

Kim Mikkelsen

*Associate Professor of Politics and Public Administration at the Roskilde School of Governance*



## World Bank Group Affiliates

Zahid Hasnain

*Senior Governance Specialist in the Governance Global Practice of the World Bank*

Kerenssa Kay

*Survey Manager at the Bureaucracy Lab of the World Bank*

Daniel Rogger

*Research Economist in the Development Impact Evaluation Research Group of the World Bank*

**Disclaimer (World Bank).** This work is a product of the Global Survey of Public Servants Consortium. The Consortium includes staff of The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank, all of which are specifically reserved.

**Organizations within the World Bank.** Within the World Bank, the members of the Global Survey of Public Servants Consortium are members of the Bureaucracy Lab, a joint initiative of the Global Governance Practice and the Development Impact Evaluation Research Group.



**Rights and Permissions.** This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO) <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo>.

**Attribution.** Please cite the work as follows: Meyer-Sahling et al. (2021) "The Global Survey of Public Servants: Approach and Conceptual Framework." Available at [www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org](http://www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org).

**Adaptations.** If you create an adaptation of this work, please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution: This is an adaptation of an original work by The Global Survey of Public Servants Consortium. Views and opinions expressed in the adaptation are the sole responsibility of the author or authors of the adaptation and are not endorsed by the Consortium partners.

All queries on this document and the Global Survey of Public Servants should be addressed to [info@globalsurveyofpublicservants.org](mailto:info@globalsurveyofpublicservants.org)

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Global Survey of Public Servants (GSPS) is an initiative to generate survey data from public servants in government institutions around the world. **The aim of the initiative is to increase the volume, quality and coherence of survey data on public administration.**

Understanding the motivations, behaviors, management practices and organizational environments of public servants through surveys is central to (1) better understand how public services and states around the world work; and, (2) help governments manage public services better. This document presents our approach and conceptual framework. Further details are available at [www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org](http://www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org).

The GSPS aims to provide a platform for consortium members, other researchers and the world's public servants and government institutions to:

1. Produce and **make publicly available a greater range of survey data on public servants and their administrations.**
2. Support mechanisms to **make public servants survey data more coherent and consistent, and thus comparable**, across independent data collection exercises.
3. Develop a **rigorous evidence base on the efficacy of methods and questions** used in surveys of public servants.
4. Collaborate with governments and other researchers to **introduce or redesign national surveys of public servants.**
5. **Provide management and cross-country benchmarking diagnostics** to governments based on public servant survey data.

**Our endeavor is at heart global, and aims to produce data and evidence on public servants across the world.** To the extent possible we aim to understand what methods and approaches work where and when in surveys of public servants. Our hope is that the surveys are useful to both academic researchers and public sector managers across the world's public administrations.

**We welcome and encourage researchers and public servants to use our publicly available resources freely**, and invite contributions from all those undertaking surveys of public servants.

To guide our effort, we **lay out a rationale for the topics our surveys focus on in a conceptual framework for the Global Survey.** In particular, we outline a production function approach to understanding the public service and discuss the core concepts for measurement within this framework. We integrate academic models of the state with a review of topics covered in existing government employee surveys. This approach allows the GSPS to meet its twin objectives of (1) advancing our understanding of how public services and states work; and, (2) providing actionable evidence for public sector management improvements.

## I. Introduction

### The Global Survey of Public Servants (GSPS)

The Global Survey of Public Servants (GSPS) is an initiative to generate survey data from public servants in government institutions around the world. The aim of the initiative is to increase the volume, quality and coherence of survey data on public administration over time. This document presents our approach and outlines our conceptual framework.

The GSPS is the product of a consortium of researchers and practitioners from Stanford University, University College London, the University of Nottingham, and the World Bank. At the time of writing, consortium members have undertaken surveys with more than 200,000 public servants in 35 countries. It aims to encourage researchers and practitioners from across the world to collaborate on an improved understanding of public service through survey data. Through better evidence, we hope for better management of the public sector.

**This document introduces the Global Survey of Public Servants (GSPS) and the conceptual framework of its core cross-country questionnaire module.**

#### [The Importance of the Public Service](#)

Governments can only be effective if those people administering government are motivated and able to administer and implement policy and services well. The administration of government happens at all levels of the public sector, from the Minister of Finance to the administrator of a small publicly owned or majority public-financed health clinic. These administrators critically enable or constrain frontline service providers such as doctors, teachers and extension workers.

The quality of a nation's public servants and the organizational environments and practices they work in have been associated with a country's economic growth, the development of infrastructure, and the delivery of public services (see, classically, Evans and Rauch 1999; Rauch 1994). For instance, in Russia, 40% of the variation in how much government institutions pay in procurement of goods and services is due to individual officials and their organizations (Best et al. 2017). In Pakistan, merit-based postings of tax inspectors raised annual tax revenue growth by over 30% (Khan et al. 2019) and in Nigeria and Ghana, whether infrastructure and other public sector tasks are completed is heavily shaped by the quality of management of public servants (Rasul and Rogger 2018; Rasul et al. 2020).

Beyond mattering for the quality of government, the nature of public service impacts wider society by determining the quality of regulation and supporting private sector development. For instance, it is associated with better business regulation and higher rates of business entry (Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2016). It shapes, through wage setting, labor markets in the private

sectors (Arpaia et al. 2014). In short, the quality of management in public administration has wide-ranging implication for societal outcomes.

### Understanding Government

In contrast to the stereotype of government as a homogenous entity and legislation that on paper harmonizes certain management practices across governments, many of its defining features make it fundamentally varied.

The diverse variety of missions and tasks of government agencies and even individuals within them implies that each agency or agent faces distinct pressures in their work and thus will judiciously organize their activities in varied ways. Ministry of Finance officials formulating a national budget have a fundamentally distinct task from an official in a public employment agency seeking to help job seekers. The task and mission of an official in a Ministry of Public Works who supervises road projects is very different to the local government education supervisor. In addition, a lack of market forces insulates the public service from external pressures that in turn reduce the pressure for conformity across actors.

Government should be seen as fundamentally diverse (Wilson 1991). Our own surveys confirm as much, underscoring that variation in management practices across and within government agencies is often larger than variation across countries (Meyer-Sahling et al. 2018; World Bank Group 2019).

Understanding government and its diversity therefore requires a large-scale empirical exercise *inside* government institutions – rather than merely “estimates” of country-level government management practices. Such data is actionable for managers of the public sector. To understand the context and potential consequences of a public sector decision or operational intervention, survey data can be collected on the specific units, groups or institutions involved. Public sector managers can then make decisions based on a greater evidence base regarding the environment in which they are operating, and the attitudes and behaviors of those whose decisions affect, or whose perceptions of existing management practices. Such data is also useful for the study of the public service. A researcher’s understanding of a specific agency can be boosted by quantitative surveys that capture the levels and variation in characteristics and experiences of public service actors and their interactions.

For many management decisions and academic studies, quantitative survey information on agencies across the public service and across governments allows for useful comparisons and benchmarks. Generating coherent data that can be used to inform policy and research is a key objective of the GSPS.

### The Power of Surveys of Public Servants

Surveys are particularly important in a public service setting, where many important features of the environment cannot be measured efficiently through other mediums. For example,

understanding how public servants are managed, their motivations, and behaviors are all internal to the official's lived experience. Management quality is fundamentally an experienced interaction that can often only be measured by employees or managers reporting it. Public employees' motivations are difficult to observe outside of their own expressions of their motives. Thus, self-reporting through surveys becomes the primary means of measurement for many aspects of officialdom. Externally sourced measures, perhaps from administrative data or expert assessments, are simply unable to record features of these important variables.

Reviews of perhaps the most famous survey of public servants, the Federal Viewpoint Survey, have argued for the capacity of such surveys to generate much needed change. It is arguably the most widely used tool of personnel management in the Federal Government of the United States (US Office of Personnel Management 2019; Government Accountability Office 2018).

The power of public servant surveys is strengthened when there is a rigorous evidence base on how best to measure these underlying features of officialdom. Thus, generating systematic and coherent evidence on the optimal approaches to surveys public servants is another key objective of the GSPS.

Similarly, the more comparative data that exists on the range of public administration environments in the public service, the more accurate will be the comparators and benchmarks available to specific managers or researchers. This is a third key objective of the GSPS.

It is worth noting here that other data sources – in particular administrative data (e.g. measuring inputs (such as pay) or outputs (such as the number of cases completed by, say, a tax official in some period of time) – can complement survey measures and add indicators of public service outputs and productivity. In combination with surveys, such data can further strengthen the ability to undertake micro-level analysis on the public service.

### [The Global State of Data on Public Servants](#)

Given the current state of global data on private citizens (such as efforts to collect data through household surveys and opinion polls), the private sector (such as the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys), and frontline service delivery agencies (such as the World Bank's Service Delivery Indicators, the OECD Teaching and Learning International Survey and government's own publications), our focus is on the administration of government. While the public sector makes up roughly a third of the economy and a third of paid employment globally (The World Bank 2018), there exists almost no large-scale cross-country data on how government is run and the characteristics and experiences of its employees. This is the gap we intend to fill.

Practically, much of the emphasis of our work has been on the administration of government outside frontline agencies (such as hospitals, schools, nurseries, police stations and prisons). This is both because service delivery surveys frequently survey the administrator/s in such organizations, and practically that much survey work must target those institutions where the number of administrators is highest to keep costs manageable. At the same time we are very

aware that the boundaries between administration and service delivery are blurred at almost every level of government, and our instrument is equally applicable to administrators in front-line offices.

A small number of largely OECD governments publish regular surveys of public officials, such as the Federal Viewpoint Survey (US Office of Personnel Management 2019), as do select individual government agencies and academics. However, data from these efforts is infrequently made public, surveys are not harmonized or made comparable across countries, and survey measures of similar concepts often diverge across countries without an evidence basis for which indicator would, in fact, best measure a concept. As a result, valid and systematic knowledge accumulation about and benchmarking between governments is precluded. The GSPS addresses this gap.

## Developing a Global Initiative

The GSPS aims to provide a platform for consortium members, other researchers and the world's public managers and public servants to generate an improved understanding of public service through survey data. As reflected in the above discussion, this has five components:

- 1. Produce and make publicly available a greater range of survey data on public administrators and their administrations.**
  - Make publicly available the questionnaires and measurement methods used by the consortium (and others where relevant) so to increase access to existing measurement tools.
  - Make micro data on public administration and public servants across countries available whenever possible while observing appropriate safeguards to ensure anonymity of survey respondents and related protections.
- 2. Support mechanisms to make public servants survey data more coherent and consistent, and thus comparable, across independent data collection exercises.**
  - Facilitate the harmonization of survey questions and methodologies for surveys of public servants by presenting existing questions and methods in an accessible form and providing methodological evidence on the efficacy of such questions and methods.
  - Present a core module of questions as a proposal for inclusion in independent surveys of public servants.
  - Publish detailed guidance on the implementation of the core module to ease comparison of any individual survey results with other surveys.
- 3. Develop a rigorous evidence base on the efficacy of methods and questions used in surveys of public servants.**
  - Include methodological experiments in surveys and make analysis of these experiments publicly available.



- Use the consortium as a basis for encouraging joint experimentation across settings to develop a more extensive evidence base on public servant surveying.
- 4. Collaborate with governments and other researchers to introduce or redesign national surveys of public servants in governments around the world.**
- Collaborate with governments and other researchers to introduce national surveys of public servants in governments who currently lack regular government-wide employee surveys.
  - Collaborate with governments to strengthen the design of existing government employee surveys.
- 5. Provide management and cross-country benchmarking diagnostics to governments based on public servant survey data.**
- Provide governments with within-country and cross-country benchmarking and management diagnostics to enable survey evidence-based management improvements.

Our endeavor is at heart global, and aims to produce data and evidence on public servants across the world. To the extent possible we aim to understand what methods and approaches work best where and when in surveys of public servants.

## The GSPS Consortium: Global Leads

The GSPS is the product of a consortium of researchers and practitioners from or associated with the University of Nottingham, Stanford University, University College London, and the World Bank. Specifically, the founding members and global leads of the consortium are:

**Stanford University Affiliates:** Katherine Bersch (Assistant Professor of Political Science at Davidson College and Research Associate at the Stanford University Governance Project), Frank Fukuyama (Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University) and Dinsha Mistree (Research Fellow and Lecturer in the Rule of Law Program at Stanford University Law School)

**University College London Affiliate:** Christian Schuster (Professor in Public Management at University College London)

**University of Nottingham Affiliates:** Jan Meyer-Sahling (Professor of Political Science at the University of Nottingham) and Kim Mikkelsen (Associate Professor of Politics and Public Administration at the Roskilde School of Governance)

**World Bank Group Affiliates:** Zahid Hasnain (Senior Governance Specialist in the Governance Global Practice of the World Bank), Kerenssa Kay (Survey Manager at the Bureaucracy Lab of

the World Bank) and Daniel Rogger (Research Economist in the Development Impact Evaluation Research Group of the World Bank)

The consortium founders all had extensive previous experience surveying public administrations across countries, including the Bureaucracy Lab Surveys (World Bank Group), the Stanford Governance Project (Stanford University) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID)-funded Civil Service Reform and Anti-Corruption project (Nottingham University and University College London), and a joint interest in expanding the breadth, comparability and quality of such survey exercises. Among them, to date they have surveyed over 200,000 public servants in 35 countries. Development of the GSPS began in 2019 and was first made public in 2021.

Other academics and practitioners are already affiliated with our work, and have been influential in defining the direction of our work. They are listed at [www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org](http://www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org).

Outside of our networks, our aim is to make the Global Survey fully inclusive, and we welcome and encourage researchers and public servants to use our publicly available resources freely, replicate the Global Survey questionnaire and strengthen its methodological foundations. We invite contributions from all those undertaking surveys of public servants that strengthen our joint capacity to survey effectively. We are happy to host and promote anonymized survey data, related questionnaire and methods, and other related materials.

## II. A Conceptual Framework for the GSPS

As detailed in section II, understanding the motivations, capabilities and environments of public servants is central to (1) better understand how public services and states around the world work; and, (2) help governments manage public services better. The Global Survey of Public Servants helps provide such an understanding by generating survey micro-data of public servants, partly as standalone measures and partly to enable comparisons both inside governments and across countries and governments. Doing this to the highest possible quality will require learning methodological lessons from across the world and consolidating them into a coherent evidence base on measurement in public administration.

### Developing a Core Module

To guide our effort, this section lays out the conceptual framework of the Global Survey. It outlines the key themes that our global core survey focuses on. We develop our own conceptual framework for the Global Survey, as (1) without a conceptual delimitation, there are too many aspects of public administration for potential measurement in any survey of public servants, particularly for what is to be a short common global core module in surveys of public

servants; and, (2) there is no consensus among practitioners or the academic community on a coherent framework or other guiding examples which could conceptually delimit a Global Survey.

This is not to say that we do not collect and publish survey data on other aspects of public administration on our consortium website. Our aim of expanding the available data and measurement tools related to public administration pushes us to publish a wide range of modules that we, and where appropriate others, have developed to assess a range of features of public administration. Where these are applied consistently across multiple settings, there is an opportunity for comparison across organizations and countries.

At the same time, achieving our aim of creating a greater degree of consistency in measurement across public service settings is bolstered by having a core module that we and others apply in as many surveys as possible. Such an approach maximizes the comparability of survey data across space and time. Being able to compare across a core of common questions within governments has been central to the management utility of surveys such as the FEVS and the UK's Civil Service People Survey. Our global common core questionnaire extends the possibility of comparison from between and within organizations and over time, to between and within countries.<sup>1</sup>

We appreciate the challenges facing any exercise that attempts to generate common data across diverse bureaucratic, cultural and political environments. Simply translating hierarchical identifiers across settings, such as the definition of a manager, generates complexities in interpretation. However, it is our belief that a short module of common questions acts as a useful complement to wider survey efforts that focus on specific settings and topics. Such questions, and comparison with findings from other settings, provide a series of benchmarks that add to the variety of lenses that can be brought to bear on a particular dataset.

An ambition of the GSPS is that a wide range of researchers and public servants will determine it worthwhile to include the core module in their surveys. As such, they should believe that they can (1) leverage cross-country survey data to improve our understanding of how public services and states around the world work; and (2) help governments manage public services better by providing actionable data to each participating government.

To that end, our intention is for the module to be short and to touch on topics of broad and general interest to scholars and practitioners. A first priority is to include a number of identifiers that we hope will be applied in as consistent a way as possible across surveys. This is the foundation for survey comparability, allowing for the characteristics of officials to be more easily compared irrespective of the questions included in the rest of the survey. The rest of our core module then measures topics that are core to the dual objective of (1) understanding of

---

<sup>1</sup> The OECD has recently introduced an effort to harmonize six questions used to assess engagement in a small number of surveys of public servants (OECD, 2019).

how public services and states around the world work and (2) providing actionable data to governments seeking to identify management improvements.

For interested readers, the conceptual framework is complemented by separate (sets of) documents laying out (1) the validation of measures of these concepts; (2) a core survey module which reflects this conceptual framework and which we recommend for inclusion in surveys across the world; and, (3) the range of additional survey modules and questionnaires that we have applied in surveys around the world. All these documents, and any updates made to them over time, are available for download on [www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org](http://www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org).

### Our Approach to the Conceptual Foundation of the Core Module

To determine which topics are of broad and general interest to both researchers seeking to understand how states work and policymakers seeking to identify management improvements, we review those topics dominant in:

- The academic research literature on academic ‘models’ of public service governance and the state in a broad sense, and their core characteristics of measurement. These include, for instance, meritocracy in a Weberian public service or performance incentives in a new public management-oriented public service.
- Survey measures that reflect key priorities of governments and are actionable to governments. To do so, we review the concepts measured across all major regular government-wide employee surveys and identify those that governments consistently measure across countries.

While there is significant overlap between the topics focused on in these two approaches, there are also some areas of divergence. Some concepts are core to models of public service management, but not typically included in government employee surveys. This is, in part, due to the fact that almost all major regular government employee surveys are implemented in OECD countries. Characteristics such as politicization and nepotism are less central to the workings of these public services and thus do not appear in most OECD country public service surveys. Yet, they are not only central to (neo)patrimonial public service governance, but also central to understanding and reforming developing country public services.

Some measures that are central to existing OECD government employee surveys, such as engagement, do not emerge clearly from reviews of academic models of public service governance. This is in large part due to the fact that ‘models’ of public service governance do not engage in-depth with organizational psychology. Management practices such as work-life balance policies or leadership to generate enthusiasm for the mission of a public sector organization are important predictors of the attitudes and behaviors of public servants (see, e.g., Esteve and Schuster, 2019) and feature prominently in OECD government employee surveys, yet models of public service governance are (with some exceptions) mute on them. Our approach to forging a core module thus aims to balance these two perspectives.

### Framing the Discussion Within a Production Function

To structure and identify which public administration topics surveys of public servants can shed particular light on, we outline a ‘production function’ for public service outcomes. In contrast to the relatively coherent consensus of models of private sector production, no consensus has formed around an integrated model of a production function for the public service. This is likely in part due to the limited availability of micro-level data on the workings of the public service to-date, which would allow for detailed differentiation of theories of officialdom. In part it is due to the complex nature of public service. However, a production function approach allows us a framing in which to discuss how distinct features of the public service relate.


## A Production Function of The Public Service

The starting point for our conceptual framework development is a production function of the public service (Figure 1). Public servants – understood in our Global Survey in a broad sense as government employees involved in the administration of government – produce outputs for citizens or other (e.g. frontline) government agencies. Such outputs range from budgets to purchasing contracts to regulation of business activity, to name a few.

The productivity of public services depends on the quality and quantity of outputs relative to inputs. Inputs include staff (i.e. public servants) and other resources (such as office space or IT systems). Inputs are converted into outputs by management practices (such as performance management practices) and public or organizational policies (which define organizational objectives and work procedures). Whether inputs effectively convert into outputs is moderated by exogenous factors (such as the political environment) and mediated by the attitudes and behaviors of public servants – such as their work motivation.

**Figure 1. Production Function of the Public Service**

Source: World Bank (2019)



Surveys of public servants can shed light on the different components of this public service productivity chain. Asking public servants about their key attitudes and behaviors (e.g. work motivation and engagement) is central to employee surveys – so much so that employee surveys are often called ‘engagement surveys’ (see, e.g., Government of Ireland, 2018; Gallup, 2020).

Measures of attitudes and behaviors are antecedents of outputs – and thus productivity. Outputs and productivity can often not be measured reliably in employee surveys. Survey measures that ask respondents to self-assess their performance, for instance, are often poorly correlated with actual work outputs (Anderson et al. 2015). However, valid measures of attitudes and behaviors – such as work motivation and job engagement – do exist and have been found to have predictive validity for organizational productivity (Grant 2008). Surveys of public servants can thus measure antecedents (and thus plausible proxies) of public service productivity.

Moreover, surveys can measure the experience of public servants with the determinants of bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors: the availability of resources to enable productivity (e.g. office space or the adequacy of IT systems), the frequency and quality of management practices (e.g. the leadership of immediate superiors) and the opportunity and constraints that public and organizational policies impose (e.g. the extent to which public servants feel empowered or constrained by rules and regulations they deal with at work). Measures of these determinants – and an analysis of their associations with key employee attitudes (such as work motivation) – makes surveys of public servants actionable: they provide organizations with statistical evidence on the levers to improve employee management.

Lastly, exogenous factors – such as the socio-economic or political-organizational context of a country – could be measured by inquiring about perceptions of public servants of, say, how crime or the state of democracy affects their work. This can be helpful in specific circumstances to governments, though objective (micro) data (e.g. about crime) can often provide proxy measures of these factors.

Thus, the production function approach laid out here highlights where surveys of public servants have particular strengths at measuring aspects of the public service, attitudes and behaviors of public servants and their organizational determinants: input availability and quality, management practices, and organizational policies and procedures. The question any survey must answer is which of these features, and what specific topics within them, will it invest precious respondent time assessing.

### III. Determining Priority Topics for Data Collection

While the public service production function provides a notional framing for concepts measured in the Global Survey of Public Servants, it does not circumscribe them sufficiently for a feasible survey instrument. The number of potential attitudes and behaviors of public servants which could be measured, and the number of potential organizational antecedents of these attitudes and behaviors is almost without limit. The question is what features of the public service production function should a Global Survey focus on. To answer this question satisfactorily for scholars and practitioners, we turn to the (1) existing academic literature on models of public service governance and (2) to prominent government public service surveys.

Neither of these reviews effectively underlines the importance of having a common means of identifying similar public servants across time and space. As a basis for consistency of comparison, a first section of the core module proposes a set of common identifiers.

#### Academic Models of the Public Service and Associated Measurement

To enable the GSPS to further our understanding of how states and public services work, the survey builds on a review of typologies or ‘ideal types’ of public service systems and, more broadly, governing modes – “the actual operating modes and administrative arrangements by which rulers govern” (Roth 1968, p. 156). We distinguish and identify associated measurements in the GSPS of three ‘ideal types’: patrimonialism, Weberian bureaucracy and (new) public management.

Max Weber (1922/1978) introduced the arguably most prominent typology, differentiating patrimonial and (rational-legal) bureaucratic modes of governing. In recognition of Weber’s contribution, the latter is frequently called ‘Weberian bureaucracy’. As we detail below, both ideal types remain relevant today in governments around the world, in what are often called ‘Neopatrimonial’ and ‘Neoweberian’ systems (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Olsen 2006; but see Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009). Concerns with the limitations of Weberian bureaucracy led to the rise of a third ideal type: new public management (or public entrepreneurial management) (see, classically, Hood 1991; Gaebler and Osborne 1991). Some scholars add governance – or variations thereof such as network governance, digital era governance, or new public governance – as a fourth ‘ideal type’ (Dunleavy et al. 2005). However, as we detail below, this fourth potential ‘ideal type’ does not come with clear differential prescriptions for public service management. As such, we do not develop separate measures in our Global Survey to account for it.

Before introducing each of the public service ‘ideal types’ or models, two important caveats are due. First, the literature is ripe with debates about what exactly the elements of these different ‘ideal types’ are (cf. Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). We thus focus on the higher-level doctrines or rationales underlying each of the ideal types and their implications for public service management: governing through loyalty and informal connections (patrimonialism); governing

through hierarchy and predictable, formal rules (Weberian bureaucracy); and governing through incentives and competition (new public management). Second, ‘ideal types’ are ideal in the sense that they approximate theoretically distinct modes of governing. In practice, governments often blend different aspects of these public service models. In fact, one of the very strengths of our survey instrument is that it provides granular data on the extent to which governments – and institutions within them – adopt in practice different aspects of these distinct public service models, based on the lived experience of public servants. The survey can thus shed much more empirically nuanced light on the workings of governments – and the institutions within them – in practice.

### Patrimonial Rule

Weber (Weber 1978) coined the term ‘patrimonialism’ for an administrative system in which rulers treat the state as private property and govern it as ‘patrons’ through informal connections with – and loyalty and reciprocity of – public employees (their ‘clients’). As Theobald (Theobald 1982) puts it,


“the essential feature of patrimonial regimes [is] . . . the exchange of resources (jobs, promotions, titles, contracts, licenses, immunity from the law, etc.) between key figures in government and strategically located individuals: trade union leaders, businessmen, community leaders, and so forth. In return for these resources, the government or heads of state receive economic and political support. The emphasis is on the personal nature of the exchange: virtually all the analyses that have resorted to the term have been informed, either explicitly or implicitly, by the model of the patron-client relationship.”

As illustrated in Figure 2 – which shows, in dark grey, countries in which political criteria are more important than merit criteria for obtaining public sector jobs according to expert perceptions – patterns of patrimonial rule persist around the world, underscoring the conceptual importance of patrimonialism for a Global Survey of Public Servants. This is not to say that such countries do not look Weberian or managerial on paper. They often have adopted merit-based public service legislation, for instance (Schuster 2017). Yet, actual public service practice in these so-called ‘neo-patrimonial’ systems remains patrimonial (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Fukuyama 2004).



**Figure 2. Countries in which political criteria are more important (dark grey) and less important (light grey) than merit criteria in public sector recruitment (according to expert perceptions)**

*Data source: Dahlström et al. (2015)*



What then are the key concepts for measurement in a survey of government personnel that derive from patrimonial rule? In terms of management practices, politicization and ‘personalization’ (nepotism) is central to public service management in patrimonial states: recruitment, promotion, pay rises, transfers and dismissals (among other personnel management decisions) are all decided on political and personal (family and friends) criteria, with patron-client (or clientelist) relations often characterized concurrently by both (political and personal) connections.<sup>2</sup>

In terms of bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors, corruption (the abuse of public office for private gain) and clientelism (the exchange of state resources for electoral support) stand out – so much so that patrimonialism (or patronage) is often equated with both (Rothstein and Varraich 2017). Corruption and clientelism can, of course, occur in public service management – for instance when public sector jobs are sold to the highest bidder or traded for political support (Colonnelli et al. 2020). However, they also shape bureaucratic attitudes and behavior more generally, with government employees campaigning for governing parties during work time and converting each public service into a quid-pro-quo with voters to generate electoral support (Oliveros 2016); and engaging in corruption to enrich both their political superiors and themselves (Figuroa 2021).

<sup>2</sup> In some world regions, other forms of connections – such as ethnic ties or tribal membership – may, of course, come into play in personnel management as well (cf. Berman 1998). As these are more region-specific (rather than globally of relevance), they do not form part of the conceptual framework for a global common core survey of public officials.

Numerous studies have underscored the negative effects of corruption on economic growth, inequality and the business environment, among many (Mo 2001; Mauro 1995); and the negative effects of clientelism on outcomes such as school enrolment, public sector deficits and corruption itself (see Hicken 2011 for a review). Moreover, politicized and nepotistic public service management is statistically associated with greater corruption, less honest bureaucracies and worse public service delivery outcomes, among many (see, e.g., Harris et al. 2020); Akhtari et al. 2018). Indicators of patrimonial rule are thus important concepts for understanding states and improving management practices.

### Weberian Bureaucracy

Weber's (Weber 1978) bureaucratic ideal-type was designed as an antidote to neopatrimonialism: bureaucrats were to become autonomous from political (or other particularistic) influences through 1) merit recruitment procedures – which, in competitive exams, evaluate their expertise rather than connections – 2) lifelong employment contracts with tenure protections which preclude politically-motivated dismissals; 3) predictable (seniority-based or educational qualification-based) career and promotion progression (to protect careers from political influence); and, 4) sufficient pay and pension benefits for lifelong economic security to reduce the temptation and need for corruption to supplement incomes. This was complemented by rule through hierarchy and supervision from the top, with a clear division of labor between administrative divisions, clear reporting lines and written rules and procedures to regulate (all) bureaucratic behavior, in line with a *Rechtsstaat* ideal (cf. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002; Olsen 2008).

This set of administrative characteristics was intended to foster a series of key (Weberian) bureaucratic characteristics: bureaucrats perceiving autonomy from politicians and acting, as a result, in a politically neutral and impartial manner on the job, for instance when delivering public services; bureaucrats developing – in lifelong public service careers – an esprit de corps of public servants, i.e. an identification with public service and a prioritization of public service over private interests (integrity); and bureaucrats becoming experts in their work and following and complying with the specialized rules and procedures governing the work in their units.

As with our patrimonial practices, there is evidence that the key Weberian management practices and bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors identified for inclusion in the GSPS may be important predictors of public service productivity and its antecedents and consequences. Merit recruitment, in particular, has been associated with greater economic growth, lower poverty and less corruption, for instance (Evans and Rauch 1999; Dahlström et al. 2012; Henderson et al. 2007; Cornell et al. 2020). Some evidence also exists for other Weberian public service management practices. Tenure protections (job stability) have been associated with less clientelism (Oliveros and Schuster 2017), while sufficient pay has been – though with more mixed effects – associated with less corruption (see Meyer-Sahling et al. 2018 for a review). Similarly, closer supervision from the top has been associated with greater honesty in public service (Meyer-Sahling et al., 2021) – though, as detailed below, greater autonomy has also

been linked to better public service delivery outcomes (Rasul and Rogger 2018; Rasul et al. 2020).

The evidence for Weberian bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors is somewhat more clear-cut. Public service identification – or, related to this concept, public service motivation – has been associated with less corruption and better public service delivery (Ashraf et al. 2020; Olsen et al. 2019). Moreover, impartiality, integrity and bureaucratic autonomy have been associated with less corruption in at least some studies (Bersch et al. 2017). Similarly, more qualified bureaucrats have been found to produce better public service outcomes (Decarolis et al. 2020). The evidence on rule following and legalism is more mixed, with legalism associated with less public sector innovation, for instance (Lapuente and Suzuki, 2020). Several indicators of Weberian bureaucracy are thus potentially important levers to enhance public service productivity.

### (New) Public Management

While Weberian bureaucracy was an antidote to patrimonialism, it created problems in its own right. From a public service management perspective, an excessive focus on rule following and the lack of incentives for public servants – promoted based on years of service or education and protected from dismissal – to work hard, innovate and deliver results stood out (Gaebler and Osborne 1991). This led to a wave of major government reforms from the 1980s that became known as New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991). While the term has been used to cover a wide variety of reforms across the world and there is a range of competing conceptualizations of it (Dunleavy et al. 2005), at its core it is a “doctrine that the public sector can be improved by the importation of business concepts, techniques and values.” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2012)

For public service management, this implied, in particular, a shift in emphasis from rule following to performance: the setting of performance targets, the measurement of their achievement and the incentivization of public servants to achieve those targets, for instance through performance pay which bureaucrats compete for and temporary job contracts whose continuation is conditional on performance. To enable public servants to meet targets, public servants were, at the same time, given greater autonomy. ‘Letting the managers manage’ was to allow managers and their subordinates to innovate (rather than strictly follow rules) to meet targets and improve performance, for instance by granting greater discretion to public managers about hiring and promotion (Gaebler and Osborne, 1991). These management practices were to foment a series of favorable attitudes and behaviors. Performance incentives were intended to motivate public servants to work hard and focus on performance rather than rule compliance, while autonomy was to give them the leeway to innovate.

There is contestation around the effects of different components of NPM. Performance incentives have been linked to greater public sector productivity, for instance greater tax intake (Khan, Adnan Q., Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken. n.d.), but often with evidence of gaming (Hood 2006; Bandiera et al., 2019). Autonomy has been linked to better public service delivery outcomes (Rasul and Rogger 2018); (Rasul et al. 2020). Less contentiously, greater work motivation, and performance and innovation orientation have equally been linked to greater

productivity (Dobni 2011); (Bellé 2013). Key indicators of new public management are thus potentially important levers for civil service productivity, providing – in conjunction with the ongoing interest in importing private-sector practices into the public sector – a strong rationale for their inclusion in the GSPS.

### Other Models and Concepts of Public Service Governance

Beyond these three ‘ideal types’ of organizing public administration, there are a multitude of other models that have been voiced in the academic literature.

In particular, the late 1990s brought with them a proliferation of other concepts attempting to conceptualize features of public service, including partnerships, networks, ‘joining up’, transparency, trust and e-government or ‘digital era governance’ (Dunleavy et al., 2006). None of these has become as ‘dominant’ a model as Weberian bureaucracy and New Public Management were (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). More importantly, none of them amount to ‘an adequate theoretical vehicle for a comparative, empirical analysis’ as the one that the Global Survey of Public Servants seeks to enable with cross-country micro-data about public servants (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), and none of them offer clearly differential prescriptions for public service management practices and differential bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors, which would not already be covered by previous models.

Moreover, a separate literature on ‘administrative traditions’ differentiates public sectors by geography, with countries sharing common or diverging administrative inheritances (Meyer-Sahling 2009). The list of “families or groups of countries” is long, however – from Anglo-American to Napoleonic to Germanic to Scandinavian to Latin American to Postcolonial South Asian and African to East Asian to Soviet to Islamic, to cite just one classification, for instance (see, e.g., Painter and Peters 2010). The peculiar administrative features of each of these regions or groups of countries can, of course, matter to the functioning of state in that region or group. For instance, varieties of communist administrations play prominent roles in contemporary and historical governments, such as the Chinese and former Soviet administration (Fukuyama 2016; Pakulski 1985). This underscores the utility of complementing the GSPS core module in a given country with measures that capture the peculiarities of the specific administrative tradition of the country. However, it also underscores – in light of the sheer number of ‘administrative traditions’ in just one classification – that any given administrative tradition does not occur with sufficient empirical frequency across the globe to warrant investigation in a global core module (though differences between countries in the Global Survey results may, of course, be subsequently linked qualitatively or quantitatively to differences in administrative traditions).

In light of this, our aim is to develop a module that measures the key elements of patrimonialism, Weberian bureaucracy, and (New) Public Management.

## A Review of Government Priorities in Existing Surveys of Public Servants

What are the key priorities for measurement when governments undertake surveys of their employees? To get a sense, we review the concepts measured in major government employee surveys in this section. We conduct our own review rather than simply reporting the review of government employee surveys in OECD as OECD (OECD 2016), includes measures from ad hoc, non-central-government-wide surveys which are not institutionalized measurement and management instruments in government, and as OECD (2016) aggregates management practices to such a degree that underlying, measurable concepts can no longer be identified (e.g. ‘effectiveness of management’ or ‘effectiveness of HRM systems’).

We focus on regular government-wide employee surveys – that is surveys that are run on a regular (annual or biannual) basis with repeated measurements (in at least three previous occasions) for a central government. We thus focus on surveys that are institutionalized as measurement and management instruments in governments. These selection criteria yield the U.S. Federal Viewpoint Survey (undertaken since 2002), the Canadian Public Service Employee Survey (undertaken since 2005), the UK Public service People Survey (undertaken since 2009), the Australian Public Service (APS) Employee Census (undertaken since 2012), the Colombian Survey of the Institutional Environment and Performance in the Public Sector (undertaken since 2009) and the Irish Public service Employee Engagement Survey (undertaken since 2015). We focus on measurement in the last year prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, as the latter led to an exceptional focus on teleworking – rather than the implementation of the regular annual survey – in a number of countries. Details are provided in an Appendix.

In line with our public service production function, we differentiate management practices and complementary inputs on one hand, and public employee attitudes and behaviors on the other. As illustrated in Figure 3, seven broad areas of management are measured across all government employee surveys reviewed: leadership (by both the direct superior and senior management), performance management, pay, training and skills development, promotion and career development, and communication and information to employees. Three further areas – practices to foster work-life balance and teamwork, as well as the sufficiency of resources (e.g. equipment) – are measured in all but one employee survey. These ten management areas are thus plausibly core to (almost) all government employee surveys.<sup>3</sup>

Government employee surveys also measure an overlapping set of core employee attitudes and behaviors. As illustrated in Figure 4, all reviewed government employee surveys measure the organizational commitment of public employees, their engagement with their jobs and their perceptions of having (manageable) workloads and work-life balance. Moreover, four


---

<sup>3</sup> There is, of course, conceptual overlap between these concepts. Leadership, for instance, often comprises communication, change management and diversity management. The concepts are disaggregated in part by the space dedicated in government employees to them (e.g. to a block of questions about change management in addition to a question block superiors and senior management).

additional concepts – job satisfaction, career/turnover intentions, integrity, and innovation attitudes – are measured in all but one of the government employee surveys. These six attitudes and behaviors are thus plausibly core to (almost) all government employee surveys.


**Figure 3. Management Practices Measured in Government Employee Surveys**

*Source: Author's calculations (only concepts covered in at least half the surveys are shown)*



**Figure 4. Employee Attitudes and Behaviors Measured in Government Employee Surveys**

*Source: Author's calculations (only concepts covered in at least half the surveys are shown)*



Thus, while the measures used in government employee surveys to measure the same concepts vary sharply across countries, the concepts themselves overlap significantly across government employee surveys. In other words, most government employee surveys measure a similar core set of concepts.

As with the concepts identified in our review of models of public service governance, there is evidence (from the public and, where that evidence is unavailable, private sector) that the concepts covered in government employee surveys are predictive of greater productivity. In terms of management practices covered in all or almost all government employee surveys reviewed, in addition to the evidence on performance management, pay and promotion reviewed above, higher quality leadership has been associated with greater public sector productivity in a range of studies (Branch et al. 2012), as have effective public sector training programs (see, e.g. Azulai et al. 2020) sufficient resources to enable effective completion of work tasks (Dasgupta and Kapur 2020) quality communication to employees (Hellweg and Phillips 1980), work-life balance practices (see, e.g., Bloom et al. 2009), and effective teamwork practices (Banker et al. 1996). While this evidence, of course, does not suggest that these are the most important practices to enhance public sector performance and productivity, the evidence does speak to their relevance as *potential* levers for greater public service productivity.

Similarly, there is evidence that the attitudes and behaviors included in all or almost all government employee surveys are significant antecedents of productivity (though with evidence that typically comes from the private rather than public sector). Employee engagement has been associated with greater productivity in dozens of studies (Sorenson 2013), as have organizational commitment (Jaramillo et al. 2005), satisfaction (Oswald et al. 2015) and, related, measures of employee intent to leave the organization (Heavey et al. 2013). Similarly and as aforementioned, perceptions of manageable workloads and work-life balance have been linked to greater organizational productivity in a range of studies (see, e.g., Bloom et al. 2009), as have measures of (favorable) employee attitudes towards innovation and change (Dobni 2011), and measures of integrity (OECD 2017)

## Comparing Concepts in Models of Public Service Governance and Government Employee Surveys

To what extent do government priorities in employee surveys mirror the concepts scholars focus on when differentiating models of public service governance? As illustrated in Table 1, there is some overlap, but there are also divergences. In terms of management practices, both scholarly models of public service governance and (almost) all government employee surveys cover performance management, pay and promotions and career development of public servants. Government employee surveys additionally give pride of place to questions about leadership, teamwork practices, effective communication with public servants, training and



skills development, sufficient resources (e.g. equipment) to complete work and work-life balance policies.

What these management practices – which are largely de-emphasized in models of public service governance – have for the most part in common is that they treat public servants not as followers of rules (Weberian bureaucracy), loyalty (patrimonialism) or incentives (new public management), but as humans with unique needs – such as needs for growth (training and skills development), relatedness with others (teamwork) or work-life balance, for instance. In other words, models of public service governance are largely silent on organizational psychology concepts in the public service, despite their prioritization of governments in employee surveys. This is, of course, not to say that there is not significant scholarship on these organizational psychology concepts in the public service (Esteve and Schuster 2019). Dozens of studies have, for instance, focused on leadership in the public sector. These organizational psychology concepts have, however, not been aggregated into a separate model of civil service governance, akin to Weberianism or new public management.

Relative to government employee surveys, models of public service governance place greater emphasis on meritocratic (or, alternatively, politicized or nepotistic) public service management, bureaucratic job stability and autonomy/supervision. The difference is less stark here, however, in that each of these concepts is covered in a subset of government employee surveys, but not consistently across them. This might be in part as, for instance, arbitrary dismissals or nepotism in public service management are arguably greater concerns in developing country governments, yet regular government-wide employee surveys are mostly conducted in OECD countries.

**Table 1. Management practices and bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors: comparing concepts from scholarly models of public service governance with government employee surveys**

Topic	Academic Models	Employee Surveys
<b>Management practices (and other inputs)</b>		
Job autonomy / Level of supervision	X	
Job stability	X	
Meritocracy / Politicization / Nepotism	X	
Pay sufficiency and structure	X	X
Performance management	X	X
Promotions and career development	X	X
Communication and information		X
Leadership		X
Resources (e.g. materials, equipment)		X
Teamwork practices		X
Training and skill development		X
Work-life balance policies		X
<b>Bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors</b>		
Expertise / Competence	X	
Performance orientation / Rule following	X	
Political clientelism / impartiality / autonomy / neutrality	X	
Public service identification / motivation	X	
Work motivation	X	
Corruption / Integrity	X	X
Innovation / Rule following	X	X
Turnover / Career intentions	X	X
Job engagement		X
Job satisfaction		X
Organizational commitment		X

What is equally remarkable is convergence around concepts that are not covered across either regular government employee surveys or models of public service governance in the public service production function. Models of public service governance are largely mute on inputs beyond management practices – such as sufficient resources to do one’s job – and bureaucratic perceptions or attitudes towards organizational or public policies. Government employee surveys do ask about resource sufficiency, but less consistently about other inputs (e.g. adequate office spaces) and, only seldomly, perceptions of organizational or public policies. For the Global Survey of Public Servants, this puts a premium on focusing – as models of public

service governance and major government employee surveys – on management practices and, to a lesser extent, resource sufficiency as organizational determinants of public service productivity (rather than other inputs in the public service production function – see Figure 1).

Similarly, for bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors, there is overlap, but there are also divergences. Both government employee surveys and models of public service governance cover corruption/integrity, the career (or turnover) intentions of public servants and attitudes towards innovation. Government employee surveys, again, give pride of place to other core attitudes, needs and behaviors in organizational psychology, such as job satisfaction, engagement and organizational commitment. Models of public service governance focus on concepts which are related, but slightly distinct. They are, for instance, more concerned with public service identification than organizational commitment (though Weber's esprit de corps also approximates the latter) and work motivation (rather than engagement). Moreover, they put a greater premium on political neutrality-related concepts (such as impartiality, clientelism and autonomy from politicians) as well as expertise and competence. Again, however, these differences are less stark than they might appear. A range of these concepts are covered in a subset of government employee surveys – just not consistently across them. The majority of (but not almost all) government employee surveys do cover (perceived) competencies and skills of public servants, for instance (figure 3).

Table 1 integrates the key management concepts and key bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors that emerge from the review of models of public service governance and lend themselves to potential measurement in the Global Survey of Public Servants.

## IV. Generating Methodological Evidence

The conceptual framework for the Global Survey outlined in this document argues for a focus on a particular set of themes given practitioner priorities in government employee surveys and a scholarly objective of understanding how states and public services operate across the world. However, thinking about the public service production function, the evidence base on whether those themes are the most predictive of public sector outcomes is limited, as is the evidence base on what the most appropriate measures for each of these themes are.

The hope of the GSPS Consortium is that as further micro-level evidence becomes available, partly through improved surveys of public servants, which of these features of public service are most critical for performance will become clearer.

The Global Survey of Public Servants therefore aims to take an iterative approach over time, encouraging survey efforts to include methodological experiments that provide information on how best to survey public servants. As best practice is learned, we will iteratively develop our questionnaire and, moreover, hope to support the community of scholars and practitioners in taking up these lessons within their survey activities.

What does this mean for the core module? Our aim is to balance stability in questions to maximize the value of comparability over space and time and responding to novel information on the value of the questions currently included. To date, we have field-tested our core module in a number of surveys (details of which are available at [www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org](http://www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org)), producing the current version of the core module.

More broadly, we are also undertaking work to better understand what variables/questions drive the majority of variation when assessing a particular aspect of public service or which variables offer greater cross-country measurement invariance (among other measurement validity analyses), whether they are included in the core module or not. Where a topic is assessed by a long-battery - as is the case for many public service motivation and employee engagement batteries, for instance - we additionally undertake measurement work to understand what elements of these batteries are critical in the aggregate scores to inform, where possible without jeopardizing content validity, shorter scales.

As we learn more about the drivers of public service outcomes, the same approach, of iteratively adapting the questionnaires we propose, can be applied to the general topics we investigate. Our approach to measurement validation is detailed in separate GSPS documents (available for download on [www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org](http://www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org)).

## V. Conclusions

This document acts as an introduction to the Global Survey of Public Servants, its core aims and rationale, and the conceptual framework underpinning its core cross-country survey. Fundamentally, we aim to:

1. Produce and make publicly available a greater range of survey data on public administrators and their administrations.
2. Support mechanisms to make public servants survey data more coherent and consistent, and thus comparable, across independent data collection exercises.
3. Develop a rigorous evidence base on the efficacy of methods and questions used in surveys of public servants.
4. Collaborate with governments and other researchers to introduce or redesign national surveys of public servants in governments around the world.
5. Provide management and cross-country benchmarking diagnostics to governments based on public servant survey data.

To provide guidance to our effort, we (1) laid out a production function of the public service, (2) argued that, within this production function, surveys of public servants have particular strengths at measuring attitudes and behaviors of public servants and their organizational determinants; (3) identified which attitudes and behaviors and organizational determinants to measure in a Global Survey of Public Servants by reviewing the core concepts in models of public service governance and the core concepts measured across major government employee surveys.

The objective of the review was to identify concepts for measurement for a Global Survey of Public Servants that would both reflect government priorities and could inform a better scholarly understanding of how states and public services work around the world. Our review allows for a conceptual winnowing which enables a survey of manageable length, that is measuring concepts which government around the world prioritize in their own measurement, and can inform the scholarly understanding of how public services – and states at-large – work.

As described in Table 1, the review identified a series of management practices on the one hand, and bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors on the other, for potential inclusion in the Global Survey of Public Servants. The concepts identified are, in some cases, prioritized in both models of public service governance and in government employee surveys. The exceptions are concepts measuring psychological needs of public servants and management practices to address them – such as work-life balance – which are central to organizational psychology scholarship in the public sector and central to government employee surveys, yet models of public service governance are largely mute on them. Vice versa – and plausibly as almost all major regular government employee surveys are implemented in OECD countries – characteristics which are central to both models of public service governance and the workings of many public services in developing countries – such as politicization and nepotism – are

missing from most government employee surveys. In that sense, our two-fold review – of both government employee surveys and models of public service governance – enables a more holistic set of concepts to measure the workings of public services around the world.

The concepts we identify are thus the starting point for our measurement exercises. Each of the concepts in Table 1 can be conceptualized in different ways. In fact, governments and scholars are conceptualizing them in different ways in their own surveys. Our approach is to explicitly acknowledge the current uncertainty in the measurement of themes important in surveys of public servants and to generate an improved evidence base on the validity of competing measures.

All related materials will be made available at the GSPS website, [www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org](http://www.globalsurveyofpublicservants.org), as they are produced. All those undertaking surveys of public servants, or interested in developing the evidence base for the measurement of the public service through surveys, are invited to contribute to the GSPS and contact the GSPS leads.

## Bibliography

- Akhtari, Mitra, Diana Moreira, and Laura Trucco. 2017. "Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services." *Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association* 110: 1–84.
- Arpaia, Alfonso, Pedro Cardoso, Francisco de Castro, Benedicta Marzinotto, and Matteo Salto, Hugo Steiner, and Alessandro Turrini. 2014. "Government Wages and Labour Market Outcomes." *European Commission*.
- Andersen, Lotte Bøgh, Eskil Heinesen, and Lene Holm Pedersen. 2016. "Individual Performance: From Common Source Bias to Institutionalized Assessment." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 26 (1): 63–78. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muv010>.
- Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, Edward Davenport, and Scott S. Lee. 2020. "Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services." *American Economic Review* 110 (5): 1355–94. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180326>.
- Azulai, Michel, Imran Rasul, Daniel Rogger, and Martin J. Williams. 2020. "Can Training Improve Organizational Culture? Experimental Evidence from Ghana's Civil Service." *The World Bank*.
- Baldoni, John. 2013. "Employee Engagement Does More than Boost Productivity." *Harvard Business Review*. 2013. <https://hbr.org/2013/07/employee-engagement-does-more>.
- Banker, Rajiv D., Joy M. Field, Roger G. Schroeder, and Kingshuk K. Sintia. 1996. "Impact of Work Teams on Manufacturing Performance: A Longitudinal Field Study." *Academy of Management Journal* 39 (4): 867–90. <https://doi.org/10.5465/256715>.
- Bellé, Nicola. 2013. "Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Public Service Motivation and Job Performance." *Public Administration Review* 73 (1): 143–53. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02621.x>.
- Berman, B. (1998). Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism. *African Affairs*, 97(388), 305-341
- Bersch, Katherine, Sérgio Praça, and Matthew M. Taylor. 2017. "State Capacity, Bureaucratic Politicization, and Corruption in the Brazilian State." *Governance* 30 (1): 105–24. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12196>.

- Best, Michael Carlos, Jonas Hjort, and David Szakonyi. 2017. "Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness." *Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research*. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w23350>.
- Bloom, Nick, Tobias Kretschmer, and John Van Reenan. 2009. "Work-Life Balance, Management Practices and Productivity." *University of Chicago Press*.
- Branch, Gregory F., Eric A. Hanushek, and Steven G. Rivkin. 2012. "Estimating the Effect of Leaders on Public Sector Productivity: The Case of School Principals." *National Bureau of Economic Research*. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w17803>.
- Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas van de Walle. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Brinkerhoff, Derick W., and Arthur A. Goldsmith. 2002. "Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming." *United States Agency of International Development*.
- Colonnelli, Emanuele, Mounu Prem, and Edoardo Teso. 2020. "Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations." *American Economic Review* 110 (10): 3071–99. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181491>.
- Cornell, Agnes, Carl Henrik Knutsen, and Jan Teorell. 2020. "Bureaucracy and Growth." *Comparative Political Studies* 53 (14): 2246–82. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912262>.
- Dahlström, Carl, Victor Lapuente, and Jan Teorell. 2012. "The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption." *Political Research Quarterly* 65 (3): 656–68. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912911408109>.
- Dasgupta, Aditya, and Devesh Kapur. 2020. "The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India." *American Political Science Review* 114 (4): 1316–34. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000477>.
- Decarolis, Francesco, Leonardo M Giuffrida, Elisabetta Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi, and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2020. "Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes." *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewaa004>.
- Dobni, C. Brooke. 2011. "The Relationship between Innovation Orientation and Organisational Performance." *International Journal of Innovation and Learning* 10 (3): 226–40.
- Dunleavy, Patrick, Helen Margetts, Simon Bastow, and Jane Tinkler. 2006. "New Public Management Is Dead: Long Live Digital-Era Governance." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 16 (3): 467–94.



- Esteve, Marc, and Christian Schuster. 2019. *Motivating Public Employees*. Cambridge University Press. 2019.
- Evans, Peter, and James E. Rauch. 1999. "Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of 'Weberian' State Structures on Economic Growth." *American Sociological Review* 64 (5): 748–65. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2657374>.
- Figueroa, Valentín. 2021. "Political Corruption Cycles: High-Frequency Evidence from Argentina's Notebooks Scandal." *Comparative Political Studies* 54 (3–4): 482–517. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020938102>.
- Freeman, Richard B., and Kathryn L. Shaw. 2009. *International Differences in the Business Practices and Productivity of Firms*. University of Chicago Press. <https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226261959.001.0001>.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Cornell University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2016. "Reflections on Chinese Governance." *Journal of Chinese Governance* 1 (3): 379–91. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2016.1212522>.
- Government Accountability Office. 2018. "U.S. GAO - Federal Workforce: Opportunities Exist for OPM to Further Innovation in Performance Management." *United States Accountability Office*. 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-35>.
- Grant, A.M. 2008. "Does Intrinsic Motivation Fuel the Prosocial Fire? Motivational Synergy in Predicting Persistence, Performance, and Productivity." *American Psychological Association*. <https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2F0021-9010.93.1.48>.
- Harris, A., J. Meyer-Sahling, K. Mikkelsen, C. Schuster, B. Seim, and R. Sigman. 2020. "Connections and Varieties of Corruption: Experimental Evidence from Five Countries." Unpublished manuscript.
- Heavey, Angela L., Jacob A. Holwerda, and John P. Hausknecht. 2013. "Causes and Consequences of Collective Turnover: A Meta-Analytic Review." *The Journal of Applied Psychology* 98 (3): 412–53. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032380>.
- Hellweg, Susan A., and Steven L. Phillips. 1980. "Communication and Productivity in Organizations: A State-of-the-Art Review." *Academy of Management Proceedings* 1980 (1): 188–92. <https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.1980.4976198>.

- Henderson, Jeffrey, David Hulme, Hossein Jalilian, and Richard Phillips. 2007. "Bureaucratic Effects: `Weberian' State Agencies and Poverty Reduction." *Sociology* 41 (3): 515–32. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038507076620>.
- Hicken, Allen. 2011. "Clientelism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14 (1): 289–310. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220508>.
- Hood, Christopher. 1991. "A Public Management for All Seasons?" *Wiley Online Library*. 1991. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1991.tb00779.x>.
- . 2006. "Gaming in Targetworld: The Targets Approach to Managing British Public Services." *Public Administration Review*. July 2006. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00612.x>.
- Jaramillo, Fernando, Jay Prakash Mulki, and Greg W. Marshall. 2005. "A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship between Organizational Commitment and Salesperson Job Performance: 25 Years of Research." *Journal of Business Research*, Special Section: The Nonprofit Marketing Landscape, 58 (6): 705–14. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2003.10.004>.
- Khan, Adnan Q., Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken. 2019. "Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings." *American Economic Association*. <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20180277>.
- Lapiente, Victor and Suzuki, Kohei (2020), Politicization, Bureaucratic Legalism, and Innovative Attitudes in the Public Sector. *Public Administration Review*, 80: 454-467. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13175>
- Mauro, Paolo. 1995. "Corruption and Growth." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110 (3): 681–712. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2946696>.
- Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik. 2009. "Varieties of Legacies: A Critical Review of Legacy Explanations of Public Administration Reform in East Central Europe." *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. October 2009. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0020852309337670>.
- Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik, Kim Sass Mikkelsen, and Christian Schuster. 2018. "Civil Service Management and Corruption: What We Know and What We Don't." *Public Administration* 96 (2): 276–85. <https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12404>.
- Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik, Christian Schuster, and Kim Sass Mikkelsen. 2018. "Civil Service Management in Developing Countries: What Works?" *UK Department for International Development*.

- Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik, Kim Sass Mikkelsen, Christian Schuster, Brigitte Seim and Rachel Sigman. 2021. The Organizational Determinants of Honesty in Public Service. *Paper presented at the International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM) Conference 2021*
- Mo, Pak Hung. 2001. "Corruption and Economic Growth." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 29 (1): 66–79. <https://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.2000.1703>.
- Nistotskaya, Marina, and Luciana Cingolani. 2016. "Bureaucratic Structure, Regulatory Quality, and Entrepreneurship in a Comparative Perspective: Cross-Sectional and Panel Data Evidence." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 26 (3): 519–34. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muv026>.
- OECD. 2016. "Engaging Public Employees for a High-Performing Civil Service." *Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development*. 2016. [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/engaging-public-employees-for-a-high-performing-civil-service\\_9789264267190-en](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/engaging-public-employees-for-a-high-performing-civil-service_9789264267190-en).
- . 2017. "Investing in Integrity for Productivity." *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*.
- Oliveros, Virginia. 2016. "Making It Personal: Clientelism, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration in Argentina." *Comparative Politics* 48 (3): 373–91.
- Oliveros, Virginia, and Christian Schuster. 2018. "Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic." *Comparative Political Studies* 51 (6): 759–92. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017710268>.
- Olsen, Asmus Leth, Frederik Hjorth, Nikolaj Harmon, and Sebastian Barfort. 2019. "Behavioral Dishonesty in the Public Sector." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 29 (4): 572–90. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muy058>.
- Olsen, Johan P. 2006. "Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART* 16 (1): 1–24.
- . 2008. "The Ups and Downs of Bureaucratic Organization." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (1): 13–37. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.101806>.
- Osborne, David, Gaebler, Ted. 1992. *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector* Perseus Books
- Oswald, Andrew J., Eugenio Proto, and Daniel Sgroi. 2015. "Happiness and Productivity." *Journal of Labor Economics* 33 (4): 789–822. <https://doi.org/10.1086/681096>.

- Painter, Martin, and B. Guy Peters. 2010. "Administrative Traditions in Comparative Perspective: Families, Groups and Hybrids." In *Tradition and Public Administration*, edited by Martin Painter and B. Guy Peters, 19–30. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. [https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230289635\\_2](https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230289635_2).
- Pakulski, Jan. 1985. "Bureaucracy and the Soviet System." *ScienceDirect*. 1985. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0039359286900025>.
- Pitcher, Ann, Mary Moran, and Michael Johnston. n.d. "Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa." *Cambridge University Press*. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/27667425?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27667425?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents).
- Pollitt, Christopher, and Geert Bouckaert. 2011. "Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis – New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo–Weberian State." *Oxford University Press*. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020852312437323>.
- Rasul, Imran. 2017. "Training for Productivity: An Experimental Evaluation of Civil Service Reform in Ghana." *American Economic Association*. <https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1889-4.0>.
- Rasul, Imran, and Daniel Rogger. 2018. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service." *The Economic Journal* 128 (608): 413–46. <https://doi.org/10.1111/eoj.12418>.
- Rasul, Imran, Daniel Rogger, and Martin J Williams. 2020. "Management, Organizational Performance, and Task Clarity: Evidence from Ghana's Civil Service." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaa034>.
- Rauch, James. 1994. "Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S. Cities During the Progressive Era." *Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research*. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w4973>.
- Rothstein, Bo, and Aiysha Varraich. 2017. *Making Sense of Corruption*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316681596>.
- Schuster, Christian. 2017. "Legal Reform Need Not Come First: Merit-Based Civil Service Management in Law and Practice." *Public Administration* 95 (3): 571–88. <https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12334>.
- Sorenson, Susan. 2013. "How Employee Engagement Drives Growth." *Gallup*. June 20, 2013. <https://www.gallup.com/workplace/236927/employee-engagement-drives-growth.aspx>.
- The World Bank. 2018. "Worldwide Bureaucracy Indicators." December 2018. <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/worldwide-bureaucracy-indicators>.

Theobald, Robin. 1982. "Patrimonialism." *World Politics* 34 (4): 548–59. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010334>.

US Office of Personnel Management. 2019. "Governmentwide Management Report." *US Office of Personnel Management*.

Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. University of California Press.

Wilson, James Q. 2019. *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. Basic Books. 2019.

World Bank Group. 2019. "Innovating Bureaucracy for a More Capable Government." *World Bank*. 2019. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31284?show=full>.

## Appendix: Government Employee Surveys Reviewed

Country	US	UK	Ireland	Australia	Canada	Colombia
Survey name	Federal Viewpoint Survey	Civil Service People Survey	Civil Service Employee Engagement Survey	Australian Public Service (APS) Employee Census	Public service employee survey	Survey about Institutional Environment and Performance
Latest pre-Covid year	<a href="#">2019</a>	<a href="#">2019</a>	<a href="#">2017</a>	<a href="#">2019</a>	<a href="#">2019</a>	<a href="#">2019</a>
Current frequency	Annual	Annual	Biannual	Annual	Annual	Annual
<b>Inclusion of Questions on Following Topics</b>						
<i>Attitudes and behaviors</i>						
Innovation and positive attitudes towards change	X	X	X	X	X	
Job satisfaction	X		X	X	X	X
Engagement	X	X	X	X	X	X
Organizational commitment	X	X	X	X	X	X
Integrity	X	X		X	X	X
Work motivation and effort	X		X	X		X
Task and mission clarity and alignment	X	X			X	X
Goal alignment	X			X	X	X
Public service / pro-social motivation / impact			X			
Unit/organizational performance (perception)	X			X		X
Sense of empowerment and involvement	X	X	X		X	
Trust	X	X				X
Workload/work-life balance	X	X	X	X	X	X
Job interest		X				
Job challenge		X				
Autonomy		X	X			
Competence and skills		X	X	X		X
Turnover and career intentions		X	X	X	X	X
Discrimination and harassment		X		X	X	X
Sense of Recognition		X		X	X	



<b>Self-efficacy</b>			X			
<b>Meaningfulness</b>			X			
<b>Person-job skill fit</b>			X			
<b>Value alignment</b>			X			
<b>Burnout</b>					X	
<i>Management practices</i>						
<b>Recruitment and selection</b>	X					X
<b>Performance management</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Training and skill development</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Pay</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Leadership (direct superior)</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Teamwork</b>	X	X	X		X	X
<b>Promotion and career development</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Diversity management</b>	X	X		X	X	
<b>Health and safety</b>	X			X	X	
<b>Leadership (senior management)</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Work-life balance policies</b>	X	X		X	X	X
<b>Communication and information</b>	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Change management</b>		X	X	X	X	
<b>Integrity management</b>	X			X	X	X
<b>Job stability</b>				X	X	X
<i>Resources and other inputs</i>						
<b>Resources (e.g. materials, equipment)</b>	X	X		X	X	X
<b>Physical conditions (e.g. office space)</b>	X				X	X
<b>Citizen perceptions of public service</b>			X			
<b>Work processes</b>				X	X	
<b>Organizational change</b>						
<b>Information sufficiency</b>	X	X				X
<b>Technology</b>						X